The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor launched the greatest naval war of all time. The attack was brilliantly timed and executed, but fatally flawed. Many say that failing to catch the U.S. carriers in port was the biggest error. Possibly so. In any case, the carriers weren’t there to be attacked.
The U.S. Pacific ww2 submarine force was there however, and it was totally ignored. Hundreds of Japanese torpedo-plane pilots flew right over—and sometimes next to—the submarine base and it’s munitions dump on neighboring Kuaha. In doing so, they missed a golden opportunity to destroy the one arm of the U.S. Navy capable of attacking the weakest link in the Empire’s chain: shipping.
Japan was an overpopulated island nation totally dependent on imports for everything from rice to oil. The large surface ships either damaged or destroyed at Pearl Harbor were impressive and powerful, but it would have been many months, or even years, before the ships could operate deep into Japanese controlled areas of the Pacific. However on the afternoon of the attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941, the order was given: Execute unrestricted air and submarine warfare against Japan. The subs, with their supplies and harbor facilities spared in the attack, were the only forces capable of responding immediately, and respond they did—slowly at first, but with gathering speed.
The year 1942 was a tentative one for the submarine forces. Outdated tactics had to be discarded, unaggressive skippers replaced, exploratory reconnaissance conducted, and new tactics developed. Only 139 ships were sunk by submarines in 1942, but the foundation was laid. With many of the tactical problems behind them, the U.S. submarine forces moved into 1943 with but one major problem: faulty torpedoes.
The year 1943 saw increasing numbers of successful patrols, most notably those of Commander Dudley “Mush” Morton and the USS Wahoo, whose outstanding patrols are described in detail in this book. His aggressive attacks gave the entire corps a lift just when they needed it.
Torpedo problems remained, highlighted by the experience of the USS Tinosa. On one occasion, the Tinosa intercepted and attacked a large tanker. Four torpedoes were fired, and although several appeared to hit the ship, only minor damage resulted. The tanker was stopped but not ready to sink. The submarine’s captain, Commander Daspit, had a sitting duck and so moved in for the kill, conning the boat to a perfect firing position 875 yards away.
He fired nine torpedoes, one after another. All hit. All were duds. In all 15 shots were fired at the tanker; 13 hit their target, but after the attack, the ship was in no danger of sinking. The captain held onto his last torpedo and headed for home. A similar incident happened to the Wahoo.
Testing showed that the better the setup, the more likely it was that the torpedo would e a dud! The problem was the firing pin: If the torpedo struck the target at a perfect 90-degree angle, the firing pin would almost always shear off and the torpedo would fail to explode. Even with this serious torpedo problem, the 1943 total went up to 307 ships sunk.
The year 1944 would see the virtual destruction of the Japanese merchant fleet. By the end of the first half of 1944, the war in the Pacific was no longer in doubt. Three of the five Japanese aircraft carriers remaining at the beginning of the year were lying on the bottom—two of them downed by submarines. The “back” of the fleet was finally broken.
With the Japanese fleet severely depleted, the submarines turned their attention to the tankers carrying fuel oil for the fleet and aircraft. One tanker after another went to the bottom. Fuel became so critical that training missions for new pilots were severely cut, and as a result, the “green” Japanese pilots were easy pickings for the now-veteran U.S. naval aviators.
The USS Tang, under the command of Dick O’Kane, had her legendary run in 1944 (her entire career is set down in Chapters 38-41, so you can trace her path and try to equal her record). With properly running torpedoes and many new boats in service, submarines sank 548 ships in 1944, effectively isolating Japan from the resources they needed to continue the war.
The year 1945 was a year of mopping up; still, one more major ww2 submarine offensive was needed to convince the Japanese leaders to give up the fight. Ships were being sunk faster than they could be replaced, and the pickings were getting slim. United States submarines hadn’t ventured back in to the Sea of Japan since the Wahoo was lost there in 1943, but with new mine-detecting devices it was now time to reenter “Hirohito’s Lake” and avenge the loss of the Wahoo.
Admiral Lockwood, COMSUBPAC, put together and ordered “Operation Barney.” Nine fleet subs—the Sea Dog, Crevalle, Spadefish, Tunny, Skate, Bonefish, Flyingfish, Bowfin, and Tinosa—ventured into the Sea of Japan to show the Emperor that the U.S. had the capability of cutting him off from the mainland completely. The operation was a resounding success with 28 merchant ships and assorted others sunk, but unfortunately, the Bonefish didn’t return. Going down with all hands, she was the last Pacific sub lost in the war.
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